Poverty reduction has emerged as a fundamental objective of development and hence a metric for assessing the aggregate performance of public policy. Declaring a policy outcome pro-poor on the basis of changes in an aggregate indicator may hide more than it reveals about the heterogeneity of impacts underlying the aggregate outcome. This paper demonstrates the use of influence functions to link poverty-focused evaluation functions to individual or household characteristics and perform counterfactual decompositions in order to identify and analyze the endowment and structural effects and their determining factors that ultimately drive pro-poor outcomes. An empirical illustration presents an analysis of the pro-poorness of the growth pattern in Bangladesh in 2000-2010. We find that socioeconomic arrangements in Bangladesh have become more progressive over time.
Introduction
Policy impact analysis entails an assessment of variations in individual and social outcomes attributable to a socioeconomic shock or the implementation of public policy. In essence, this is an exercise in social evaluation. According to Sen (1995) we can learn a great deal about any evaluative approach by considering its informational basis, the identification of which involves a distinction between the information required to pass judgment in the chosen approach and that which has no direct evaluative role. This author further identifies two basic components of the informational basis: the focal space and the focal combination. The former specifies the objects of value or desirable outcomes while the latter provides a rule for combining individual outcomes into an aggregative indicator of the prevailing social state. The focal combination is essentially a social evaluation function (e.g. social welfare function) used to rank states of the world. These considerations, along with the need to understand the determinants of outcomes, suggest that an evaluation framework can be structured around three basic dimensions: (1) the metric used to identify desirable outcomes; (2) attribution of outcomes to explanatory factors; and (3) ranking of social states.
The policy objective defines the yardstick by which to assess policy impact. It is commonly accepted that maintaining and improving the living standard of the population is the ultimate goal of public policy and a fundamental expectation of the governed (Sen et al. 1987) . The concept of living standard thus plays a crucial role in the specification of the focal space for policy evaluation. The ranking of social states entails the use of a social evaluation function (i.e. the focal combination) and a decision rule for choosing socially desirable outcomes. Poverty reduction has emerged as a fundamental social objective of development and hence a metric for assessing the aggregate performance of public policy.
In the context of a poverty-focused evaluation, one is interested in whether the distributional changes induced by policy or by the development process in general are "pro-poor" or not?
The pro-poorness of a distributional change depends on the chosen value judgments.
A variety of standards underlie the concept of pro-poorness. In general, a pro-poor policy leads to a social outcome that is favorable to the poor in some sense. As Duclos (2009) explains, 1 the translation of the term "favorable" can be based on an absolute or a relative standard of evaluation. Let y0 represent a distribution of outcomes (say living standards) in the absence of the policy under consideration. Also let y1 stand for the outcome distribution induced by policy implementation. An absolute pro-poor standard is a quantity, say α, such that a change in the overall distribution from y0 to y1 (e.g. as the result of a policy intervention or the process of economic growth) will be considered pro-poor if the outcomes for the poor all change by at least the amount α. A relative pro-poor standard is defined by a factor (1+ρ) to indicate the minimum change in living standards that society would like the poor to experience given the change in the overall distribution. According to this relative standard, a policy that changes the overall distribution from y0 to y1 will be considered pro-poor if the outcomes for the poor change by a factor of at least (1+ρ). For instance, if this standard is set to the ratio of the mean of y1 to that of y0 then a pro-poor policy should increase the outcomes of the poor in proportion to overall average growth. For Ravallion and Chen (2003) and Kray (2006) , a distributional change is pro-poor if it involves poverty reduction for some choice of poverty index, P. Osmani (2005) argues that a poverty-reducing change should not be considered automatically pro-poor. He recommends that a policy intervention be considered pro-poor if it achieves an absolute reduction in poverty greater than would occur in a benchmark case. Such a benchmark could be a counterfactual or some socially desirable outcome. Essama-Nssah and Lambert (2009) use poverty elasticity to pass pro-poor judgments in a way that is consistent with Osmani's recommendation, using distribution neutrality as the benchmark.
The second issue that one must confront in the formulation of a poverty-focused criterion is whether more weight should be given to the outcome of the poorer of the poor.
The construction of a criterion involves aggregation across individuals or households, for which a value judgment, e.g. of the degree of inequality or poverty aversion, is typically assumed. Evaluation functions which give more weight to the poorer of the poor are consistent with the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers based on the idea that less inequality is preferred to more.
Declaring a policy outcome or a pattern of growth pro-poor is the result of an aggregate judgment that may hide more than it reveals about the heterogeneity of impacts underlying the aggregate outcome. Yet, for policymaking and evaluation purposes, there is a need for a deeper understanding of this diversity in policy impacts. Such an understanding could stem from the view that a policy intervention is basically a social arrangement. In other words, an intervention is a mechanism for controlling and coordinating the behavior of concerned socioeconomic agents toward the achievement of the policy objective. In this perspective, an individual outcome is a function of participation and type, where type is characterized by such things as preferences, capabilities, information and beliefs (Milgrom 2004) . In general, the outcome obtained by an individual from participation (in an intervention) is a result of the interaction between opportunities offered by the intervention and the readiness and ability of the individual to take advantage of such opportunities.
Linking individual outcomes explicitly to participation and type provides an opportunity to account for the contributions of each of these factors into changes in the distribution of outcomes from one state of the world (e.g. policy state) to another (e.g. counterfactual state). Differences in outcome distributions therefore reflect, among other things, differences in participation and in the distribution of the characteristics underlying the definition of type. Such characteristics may be observable or not.
The main purpose of this paper is first to demonstrate how influence functions can be used to link a variety of measures of pro-poorness to household (or individual) characteristics, and second to perform counterfactual comparisons in order to identify the composition and structural effects. The structural effect determines the impact of policy viewed as returns to participation, whilst the composition effect measures the influence of changes in individual or household characteristics interpreted as endowments. 2 A decomposition method can be viewed as an input-output process that translates variations in a variable of interest into a set of contributory factors known as the terms of the decomposition. Basically, such a method is characterized by the outcome model which links the outcome of interest to its determining factors, and by the strategy used to identify and hence estimate the terms of the decomposition. The classic Oaxaca-Blinder method seeks to decompose the overall difference in the unconditional mean of an outcome distribution between two groups or time periods into a component due to changes in the distribution of individual (or household) characteristics (i.e. the composition or endowment effect), and another due to changes in the returns to those endowments (i.e. the price or structural effect). The method relies on the law of iterated expectations to link the unconditional mean outcome to endowments, and on counterfactual comparisons 3 based on ceteris paribus variations to identify and estimate those effects.
We focus here on decomposing variations in poverty outcomes. All poverty measures considered here (and in fact all social evaluation functions) can be viewed as real-valued functionals of the relevant outcome distributions. This is our starting point in modeling poverty outcomes. Furthermore, an outcome distribution reflects variation in individual outcomes based on variation in type and participation. These considerations motivate our linking relevant social evaluation functions to individual or household characteristics and performing counterfactual comparisons to identify the composition and structural effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the decomposition framework based on the logic underlying the Oaxaca-Blinder approach, and this is where 2 The composition and structural effects are also known as endowment and price effects respectively (Bourguignon and Ferreira 2005) . 3 Counterfactual comparisons are commonly used to identify the causal effect of an intervention because the effect of a cause can be understood only in relation to another cause (Holland 1986) . This is the same idea underlying the economic principle of assessing the return to a resource employed in one activity relative to its opportunity cost (i.e. what it would have earned in the next best alternative use). A counterfactual state is the state of the world that, most likely, would have prevailed in the absence of the intervention. The analogy between treatment effect analysis and the decomposition approach used in this paper has been extremely useful for the development of flexible methods of estimating composition and structural effects.
we will encounter influence functions. An influence function is essentially the first-order (directional) derivative of the associated functional. Section 3 applies that framework to understanding the pro-poorness of the pattern of economic growth in Bangladesh in [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . Concluding remarks are presented in section 4. We find that the distributional change observed over the 2000-2010 period is unambiguously pro-poor. Furthermore, the configuration of the endowment and structural effects suggests that socioeconomic arrangements in Bangladesh have become more progressive over time.
A Counterfactual Decomposition Framework
Pro-poor judgments define criteria that might be used to rank social states. For policymaking purposes, it is not enough to declare an outcome pro-poor or not, one is also generally interested in understanding the drivers of the observed outcome. In this section, we present a decomposition framework that can often help with the identification of sources of variation in social outcomes. Even though we are interested in decomposing variations in poverty outcomes, it is instructive to present the analytical framework in more general terms. We thus organize the discussion in terms of decomposing variations in social outcomes represented by social evaluation functions. A decomposition method is characterized by the underlying outcome model and the identification strategy for estimating the terms of the decomposition. We focus on modeling the social outcome and the identification and estimation of the composition and structural effects. We also present some recentered influence functions that one can use in poverty-focused evaluation and explain their roles.
The Outcome Model
Let θt stand for the social outcome of interest at a particular point in time, t. We take t=0 and t=1 subsequently to indicate pre-and post-intervention time points. This is a distributional statistic characterizing the social state represented by the distribution of individual outcomes Fy. This social outcome can be viewed as a functional of Fy, and expressed as follows. At this point, we need a way to link the social outcome explicitly to individual (or household) characteristics. For this, we rely on the concept of influence function. Basically, the influence function of a functional θ(F) is its first-order directional derivative (Hampel 1974) . Let F and M be two distributions and θ(•) a distributional statistic that is qualitatively or infinitesimally robust 4 . When M is close to F, then θ(M) should be close to θ(F). Letting be a distribution where the value y occurs with probability 1, now take for M the distribution in which an observation is randomly sampled from distribution F with probability (1-b) or from with probability b. Thus To assess the impact of covariates on , one needs to integrate over the conditional expectation . This can be easily done using regression methods as we shall discuss later on. 5
The Endowment and Structural Effects
We are interested in decomposing a change in the social outcome defined in equation (2.1) from the base period t=0 to the end period t=1. Let stand for the 5 There is indeed an intimate relationship between regression and the conditional expectation function (CEF). Any random variable y can be decomposed into a component associated with x, , and a residual, ε, that is uncorrelated with any function of x. In other words, and . On the basis of this observation, Angrist and Pischke (2009) argue that the CEF is a good summary of the relationship between y and x in the sense that it is the best predictor of y given x in the class of all functions of x. This property stems from the fact that the CEF minimizes the mean squared error of prediction. Furthermore, if the CEF is linear then it is the population regression function since the latter solves the least squares problem at the population level. As it turns out, even when the CEF is nonlinear, regression is still the best linear approximation to it. outcome distribution observed in the base period and the outcome distribution observed in the end period. The overall variation in induced by the distributional change from period 0 to period 1 is equal to the following.
(2.7)
We need to consider the conditions under which we can split this difference into endowment and structural effects along with an estimation procedure to recover these objects from available data.
Identification
Identification concerns restrictions that must be placed on the outcome model in order to recover in a meaningful way the terms of the decomposition. In the context of policy impact evaluation, all identification strategies seek to isolate an independent source of variation in policy and link it to variation in outcome to determine policy impact. This process usually entails a comparison of the observed policy outcome with a counterfactual representing what would have happened in the absence of the policy under evaluation.
The construction of the counterfactual state relies on the notion of ceteris paribus variation.
In other words the only difference between the observed and counterfactual states is policy implementation, everything else is the same. Similarly, decomposition methods in economics rely on this fundamental strategy to identify the terms of the decomposition. In particular, the contribution of a given factor to a distributional change is identified by comparing the outcome distribution observed at the relevant point in time with a counterfactual distribution obtained by changing the factor under consideration while holding all other factors fixed.
The social outcome model discussed above suggests that there are four factors that potentially can account for the distributional change characterized by equation (2.7). The observed distributional change may be due to: (i) Differences in the distribution of observed characteristics, x; (ii) Differences in the distribution of unobserved attributes, ε (see (2.2)); (iii) Differences in the returns to observed characteristics as determined by the pay-off functions h(•); (iv) Differences in the returns to unobserved characteristics as determined by the pay-off functions h(•) in (2.2). Without imposing any separability assumption on the structure of these pay-off functions, we cannot distinguish the contribution of observable characteristics from that of the unobservables. We therefore lump the last two terms into a single one that we refer to as the structural effect, denoted by: . For this term to be meaningfully interpreted as structural effect, it must reflect solely differences in the pay-off function. This function must therefore remain stable as the distributions of characteristics (observed and unobserved) change from one period to the next. This would be the case if there were no general equilibrium effects associated with changes in the distribution of characteristics.
Let and stand respectively for the contributions of differences in the distributions of x and ε to the overall distributional change . Under the assumption of no general equilibrium effects, we can write the overall distributional change as follows:
. For this term to be meaningful and identifiable, it must emerge from a ceteris paribus variation of the distribution of observable characteristics. This would be the case if variations in the distribution of observables were not confounded by changes in the distribution of unobservables. It is common to impose the ignorability assumption in order to secure the identification of the composition effect when general equilibrium effects have been ruled out. This assumption, also known as conditional independence, translates the idea that the conditional distribution of unobservables (ε) given the observables (x) is the same in both periods. Hence: , and the structural effect is identified by:
The aggregate decomposition of (2.7) thus boils down to: . Alternatively, we have:
This is obtained by subtracting from and adding to the overall distributional change the counterfactual outcome . Letting P stand for the poverty measure of interest, then equation (2.10) for the observed change in poverty between the base and end periods can be decomposed as follows.
( 2.11) where the first term on the right hand side represents the structural effect and the second the composition effect.
Estimation by RIF Regression
There are both parametric and nonparametric approaches for estimating the terms of the above decomposition. In this paper we follow a parametric approach based on RIF regression. This entails the specification of a regression model on the basis of the conditional expectation of the RIF. This could be a linear or a nonlinear model. In particular, modeling this conditional expectation as a linear function of the observed covariates leads to the following expression: . The expected value of the linear approximation of the RIF regression is equal to the expected value of the true conditional expectation because the expected value of the approximation error is zero (Firpo et al. 2009 ).
We can then apply Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to the following equation to obtain estimates of the relevant parameter:
(2.12)
Applying the standard Oaxaca-Blinder approach, 6 we compute the structural effect (2.13) where are the OLS estimates of the coefficients of the observed covariates in (2.12) and are the sample counterparts of the following expectations:
. The composition effect is (2.14)
RIF regression thus offers a simple way of establishing a direct link between a social evaluation function and individual (or household) characteristics. This link offers an opportunity to perform both aggregate and detailed decompositions for any evaluation criterion for which one can compute an influence function. This fact makes the extension of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to RIF regressions both simple and meaningful. Assuming that the RIF regression model is linear makes it possible to further decompose the endowment and structural effects in terms of the contributions of the relevant covariates 7 .
RIFs for Poverty-Focused Evaluation
We now consider some recentered influence functions we will use in the empirical section for decomposing pro-poorness. 8 Pro-poor judgments are formulated on the basis of variation in poverty outcomes. Potential dominance relations between the initial and end outcome distributions provide a basis for passing unanimous pro-poor judgments.
Denote the poverty level associated with a distribution F and poverty line z as P(F; z). Thus 6 As noted in the introduction, the standard Oaxaca-Blinder method seeks to decompose a change in the unconditional mean, μF, of an outcome distribution into a structural and a composition effect. It can be shown that the influence function of the mean is: . Therefore, and .
The conditional expectation function underlying RIF regression is: . One can apply the law of iterated expectations to this expression to recover the unconditional mean of y. The standard Oaxaca-Blinder method assumes a linear regression model so that the equivalent of equation (2.12) is:
. In addition, it is assumed that the conditional expectation of the error term given the observables is equal to zero. One can therefore indentify and estimate the structural and endowment effects by running OLS regression of y on x and using equations (2.13) and (2.14) just ahead. The point here is that the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is fully consistent with the RIF regression framework. 7 This can be easily seen by writing the estimate of the endowment effect as:
. or . The corresponding expression for the structural effect is: or . Thus, a distributional change from period 0 to period 1 would be considered pro-poor on the basis of the relative standard (1+ρ) if and only if: .
Poverty comparisons based on this dominance criterion are known as first-order pro-poor judgments.
When the density function associated with the relevant cumulative distribution function (CDF) is continuous and strictly positive, the τ th quantile, qτ, of the distribution is equal to the inverse of that distribution at . First-order pro-poor judgments based on the relative standard (1+ρ) can therefore be equivalently expressed as:
, where rate of change of outcome at the τ th quantile. If income is the outcome variable, then is the growth incidence curve (GIC) ordinate at τ. One can therefore study the contributions of the endowment and structural effects to pro-poorness by decomposing the growth incidence curve (GIC) using the following RIF of the τ th quantile of the outcome distribution: where the first component stands for the structural effect and the second the composition effect. In the case of a linear RIF regression model, these effects can be further decomposed to identify the contributions of the covariates of interest.
When growth is distribution neutral, the rate of income growth at every percentile is equal to the rate of growth of the mean, . This quantity can also be expressed as a weighted sum of points along the GIC as follows: . Thus, on the basis of equation (2.17), we can decompose the rate of growth into an endowment and a structural effect. Since the level and pattern of growth depend on factor accumulation and productivity, we interpret the endowment effect as an indicator of changes in factor accumulation and the structural effect as an indicator of changes in productivity.
The RIF for the ordinate of the GIC at τ is:
where stands for the first-order derivative of an elasticity function, , measuring the responsiveness of (income) y to a 1 percent growth in the overall mean (income). Equivalently, we can express this RIF as follows. . This condition is equivalent to:
. It is the second-order analog of the condition underlying first-order pro-poor judgments; firstorder pro-poorness implies second-order pro-poorness, but not the other way around.
where the first component is:
. It depends on whether or not .
The second component, , depends on the level of y relative to the τ th quantile .
A dominance relation yields only a partial ordering between the initial and the posterior outcome distributions. One way of proceeding is not to insist on unanimity, but to compare distributions on the basis of value judgments underlying a specific poverty measure. This approach leads to complete ranking of alternative outcome distributions. The first term on the right hand side of (2.24) is the structural effect ( ) and the second is the composition effect, .
Empirical Considerations
Policy analysis in general can be viewed as a process designed to provide evidence to answer questions that decision makers care about. We then apply the counterfactual decomposition framework described above to identify factors that might explain the observed pattern of growth and its poverty implications. To further characterize the extent of pro-poorness of the observed distributional changes, we follow Osmani (2005)'s recommendation that a distributional change be considered pro-poor if it induces an absolute reduction in poverty greater than would occur in a benchmark case. In particular we consider a distributional change pro-poor if it reduces poverty more than would a distribution neutral change. Using available data, we compute an additive and a ratio measure of pro-poorness(Essama-Nssah and Lambert 2009, Kakwani and Pernia 2000). The results are presented in table 3.3 for the headcount, the poverty gap, the squared poverty gap and the Watts index. A distributional change is considered pro-poor if the additive measure is positive or the ratio measure greater than one. The results in table 3.3 show that the underlying distributional changes are pro-poor in the sense of Osmani (2005) given distribution neutrality as benchmark case.
A Profile of Growth, Inequality and Poverty

Accounting for Changes in Observed Outcomes
What is driving the steady decline in poverty observed in Bangladesh in the last decade? Any answer to this question based on counterfactual decomposition depends on how one chooses to model poverty. We consider first changes in aggregate poverty. We then try to account for the heterogeneity of impacts underlying aggregate outcomes. The starting point of most decomposition methods is to consider a poverty measure as a functional of the underlying distribution of living standards which is fully characterized by its mean and the degree of inequality. Thus changes in poverty can be seen as driven by changes in these same factors. In particular, one can decompose changes in poverty in terms of two components. The size effect is linked to changes in the mean of the underlying outcome distribution while the redistribution effect is associated with changes in relative inequality. 12 Table 3 .4 shows the results of a Shapley decomposition of changes in aggregate poverty in Bangladesh over the 2000-2010 period. 13 Because the size and redistribution effects are negative for all poverty measures considered, we conclude that both effects contributed to the observed poverty reduction. However, in absolute value, the size effect is much greater than the redistribution effect. Therefore, the observed poverty reduction was driven mostly by the increase in per capita expenditure. Decomposing changes in aggregate poverty into a size and a redistribution effect provides limited information for policymaking since it is hard to target aggregate statistics such as the mean of a distribution or a measure of its inequality with policy instruments.
Changes in Aggregate Poverty
12 See Essama-Nssah (2012) for a detailed discussion. 13 The Shapley value, a solution to a cooperative game with transferable utility, provides a formula for dividing a joint cost or a jointly produced output among claimants on the basis of individual contribution to the formation of total cost or the production of a surplus. According to Moulin (2003) this formula can also be viewed as an interpretation of the reward principle of distributive justice. The Shapley decomposition respects the following value judgments: (i) Symmetry or anonymity: the share assigned to any factor does not depend on its label or the way it is listed; (ii) adding up: all shares must add up to the total; (iii) the share of each factor is taken to be its (first round) marginal impact.
We therefore focus on decompositions based on the notion that the distribution of living standards and the associated poverty outcomes are determined by individual endowments and returns to those endowments. Table 3 head, land ownership, the number of non-farm enterprises, electricity, safe latrine, and remittances. The results for the main occupation and location do vary somewhat across models and years. However, among the occupations considered, self and salaried employment tend to be associated with poverty reduction (relative to employment in agriculture, the reference occupation) across models and years. In the case of geographical location, the results show that residence in Chittagong or Sylhet is associated with poverty reduction compared to residence to Dhaka Division.
14 Many of the variables are dummies or categorical. We dropped categories in such a way that the reference household is landless, with no electricity or safe latrine and does not receive remittances. It resides in the rural part of Dhaka and is headed by a male with no education who is Muslim, not married and works in agriculture.
The decomposition results presented in table 3 The change in the pattern of the contribution of endowment and structural effects to poverty reduction as described above is confirmed by the decomposition of shifts in the TIP curve presented in figure 3.2. Each panel of that figure show three curves: the overall change in the TIP curve, the endowment and the structural effect. All three curves lie below the horizontal axis (through zero). This means that both the endowment and the structural effects contribute to poverty reduction as measured by members of the FGT family. The distance between the horizontal axis and a given curve indicates the magnitude of the effect. The further the curve is from the horizontal axis, the more the associated effect reduces poverty. 
Growth Incidence
Pro-poorness provides a characterization of a distributional change. In the case of economic growth, this change can be represented by the corresponding GIC, which also provides a basis for first-order pro-poor judgments. We now consider how the endowment and structural effects vary along the GIC. Past this point the endowment effect dominates the structural effect and the gap between the two becomes wider and wider as we move to the upper part of the distribution. The structural effect turns negative from the 75 th percentile on. These observations imply that it is the composition effect that keeps the GIC above zero while the structural effect accounts for the slightly declining slope of the GIC and hence the modest fall in relative inequality observed over the period. The relationship between the endowment and structural effect depicted in figure 3 .4 also explains our earlier finding that, compared to the structural effect, the endowment effect accounts for a larger share of the variation in poverty outcomes over the 2000-2010 period.
Looking at the sub-periods, The study of economic growth is anchored on two basic ideas: accumulation and productivity. 15 Growth accounting is an exercise designed to identify the key drivers of economic growth by decomposing the growth of output into two components: one attributable to changes in factors of production such as physical and human capital, and a residual not related to changes in input levels. This residual is interpreted as the rate of change in total factor productivity (TFP). Thinking of the living standard of an individual or a household as an outcome of participation in the life of society (subject to type and circumstances that determine the returns to type from any social interaction) clearly establishes an analogy between growth accounting and the counterfactual decomposition of the GIC considered here. On the basis of this analogy, we link the endowment effect to accumulation and we take the structural effect to be an indicator of productivity in socioeconomic interaction. Thus, the fact that the structural effect is inequality reducing over the entire period (while the endowment effect tends to increase inequality) and accounts for a larger share of the poverty reduction observed in the second half of the decade suggests that socioeconomic arrangements in Bangladesh have become more progressive over time. 
Concluding Remarks
Poverty reduction has emerged as an important objective of socioeconomic development and therefore a metric for evaluating the performance of public policy. Policy evaluation can be viewed as a process designed to provide evidence to answer questions that decision-makers and other stakeholders care about. In particular, policymakers are This paper demonstrates how to use influence functions and counterfactual decomposition to identify and estimate factors that might account for variation in poverty outcomes.
A key step in explaining an outcome involves establishing an association between that outcome and possible explanatory factors. Pro-poorness is a characterization of a change in the distribution of living standards on the basis of value judgments that define the chosen standard of evaluation. A distribution is fully determined by its mean and the degree of inequality. Pro-poorness can therefore be seen as driven by these factors.
However, it is hard to target distributional statistics such as the mean or a measure of inequality with policy instruments. The living standard of an individual (or household) is a pay-off from participation in the life of society subject to individual endowments and the circumstances that determine the returns to those endowments from social interaction.
The paper relies on the concept of influence function and the conditional expectation function to establish a parametric relationship between the relevant distributional statistics and household characteristics. Given a set of covariates representing those characteristics, the conditional expectation of the RIF of a distributional statistic captures the essence of that relationship.
The relationship between a distributional statistic (such as a poverty measure) and household characteristics offers an opportunity to identify the sources of variation in that statistic or in the underlying distribution in terms of the endowment and structural effects. Since the structural effect is inequality reducing and linked to circumstances that determine returns to endowments in social interaction, the switch in the relative importance of the two effects from the first sub-period to the second suggests that socioeconomic arrangements in Bangladesh have become more progressive over time.
However, when the overall distributional change is considered, the endowment effect dominates the structural effect. A detailed decomposition further reveals that these effects are driven mostly by demographics, amenities, location and education.
We conclude by pointing out that, even though they are derived from counterfactual comparisons along with assumptions used to identify the causal effect of an assigned intervention, the decomposition results discussed in this paper do not provide a causal explanation of the observed outcomes. The logic of causal inference entails establishing a plausible association between the outcome of interest and the explanatory factor, and ruling out alternative explanations (i.e. confounders) of that association. Furthermore, causal explanation clarifies the mechanisms that bring the outcome about. The approach followed here relies on associational inference based on the conditional expectation function which is a reduced form of the underlying causal mechanism. Given that the living standard of an individual is an outcome of her participation in the life of society that depends on endowments, behavior and the circumstances that determine the returns to these endowments from any social interaction, a causal explanation of pro-poorness must rest on a full structural model of individual behavior and social interaction.
While the decomposition method used in this study does not provide a causal explanation of pro-poorness, it can help quantify in a descriptive sense the contribution of various factors to changes in poverty or distributional outcomes. Such an accounting exercise identifies factors that are quantitatively important and therefore deserve more attention either for further analysis or for policy targeting. On the basis of these considerations, Fortin et al. (2011) suggest a two-step approach to analyzing distributional changes whereby the standard decomposition method discussed in this paper would be applied first to identify the main forces driving the observed changes. Then, counterfactual decompositions based on a structural model would be used to explain the results from the first step. 
